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R583have accumulated within a single allele
in the short time window since house
mice populations havebeen exposed to
anticoagulant pesticides. The fact that
all amino acid substitutions in the
introgressed vkorc1 gene strongly
inhibit vitamin K epoxide reduction [18],
and thus are likely to contribute to
resistance, would support this
hypothesis. Whether the overall fitness
advantage of acquiring resistance
through introgression is greater than
from de novomutations or standing
genetic variation remains to be
determined.
While Kohn and colleagues’ study of
introgression in European mice [12]
does not by itself answer the overall
question about how frequent adaptive
introgression is in nature, it does make
several important contributions. First,
it provides an example of the multiple
lines of evidence required to
convincingly document adaptive
introgression, ranging from
identification of the causative genes
and traits to documentation of their
fitness effects to reconstruction of
their molecular evolutionary history.
Second, it suggests that introgression
may play an important evolutionary role
through the simultaneous transfer
of multiple advantageous mutations
within genes, in addition to the
exchange of favorable sets of genes
as previously theorized. Lastly, thestudy implies that human-mediated
changes in selection pressures and
dispersal patterns may frequently
create conditions where introgression
is adaptive. The latter two insights
enlarge the circumstances under which
introgression is likely to facilitate
adaptive evolution, suggesting that
close to 40 years after Heiser’s seminal
review [1] the time may have arrived to
re-examine introgression once again.References
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Bodies in the BrainA recent study has found that activity in multisensory brain areas, namely the
premotor cortex, intraparietal cortex and the putamen, mirrors the vividness
of ownership over a mannequin, induced by the body-swap illusion.G. Lorimer Moseley
Rene Descartes was a mind-body
dualist. Yet he was painfully aware of
how closely united we are with our
body: ‘‘I am not merely lodged in my
body as a pilot in a ship, but.. I am so
closely united to it that I seem to
compose with it one whole. For if that
were not the case, when my body is
hurt, I, the thinking thing, should not
feel pain, but would perceive the
wound just as the sailor perceives
something damaged in his vessel’’(1641). Almost five centuries later, we
are beginning to understand how this
sense we have that our body is ours is
produced by the human brain. An
important paper by Petkova et al. [1],
published recently in Current Biology,
suggests a possible neuroanatomy of
this sense of full-body ownership. In
three separate studies involving the
experimental manipulation of whole
body ownership in healthy human
volunteers, the authors show that
activity in premotor cortex, intraparietal
cortex and putamen, mirrors theself-reported vividness of the full-body
ownership illusion. The authors argue
that two mechanisms underpin our
sense of owning our entire body — the
integration of visual, tactile and
proprioceptive information in
body-part-centered frames of
reference, and the perceptual binding
of the separate body parts into a unified
percept of whole-body ownership.
That multisensory illusions can be
relatively easily induced experimentally
has been appreciated for some
time — Tastevin [2] first reported
illusory ownership over an artificial
finger over 70 years ago. Botvinick and
Cohen [3] reignited interest with their
account of the rubber hand illusion and,
since then, a great deal has been
uncovered about the nature, extent and
neural substrate of limb ownership in
healthy and clinical populations (see [4]
for review). Petkova et al. [1] used an
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illusion that one has adopted a
mannequin for a body — the ‘body
swap illusion’ — while participants
underwent functional brain imaging.
To induce the illusion, the participant is
tapped on the chest while they watch,
through a head mounted display, a first
person perspective of a mannequin
being tapped on the chest (i.e.
a view from the perspective of the
mannequin’s head). The taps are
synchronised.
These illusions exploit the brain’s
predilection for congruence between
multiple sensory modalities. Most
studies have used synchronous tactile
and visual input, which led to the
suggestion that multisensory cells
underpin the illusion [5]. That is, visual
input of the stimulus occurring on
the artificial hand or body activates
multisensory mechanisms, and tactile
input of the stimulus occurring on the
actual hand or body activates the same
multisensory mechanisms. Together,
they signal a single multisensory event.
Visual input is not critical to induce
illusory ownership. For example, the
illusion can be induced without visual
input by the participant stroking a
rubber arm while the experimenter
simultaneously strokes the
participant’s other arm [6]. Once
illusory ownership is in place, closing
one’s eyes does not break it [7]. Tactile
input is not critical either — passive or
active movement of an anaesthetised
finger combined with visual input of
a fake finger undergoing the same
movement induces a vivid sense of
ownership over the fake finger [8].
Indeed, the ‘fake finger’ experiments [8]
suggest that precise synchrony of
bimodal inputs induces a stronger
illusion than less precise multisensory
inputs — it is the synchrony of inputs,
not the multisensory extent of those
inputs, that seems most important.
It has been proposed that different
brain areas underpin the induction
and the maintenance of illusory limb
ownership [9]: intraparietal and
premotor cortices initiate the illusion
and the right insula and frontal
operculum subserve the sense of
ownership that follows. That damage
to the right insula is an important
determinant of ‘disturbed sensation
of limb ownership’ after stroke [10],
and that the rubber hand illusion is
associated with limb-specific
disruption of autonomic control [7],
lend support to the importance of theinsula. Petkova et al. [1], however,
report significant illusion-related
activation in insula cortex in only one
of their three studies and even then,
activation was only apparent at lower
statistical thresholds. Perhaps insula
cortex activity does not fluctuate with
experimental condition because during
the ‘off’ condition the participant
still has a sense of ownership, it is
just over their own actual body,
not the artificial one.
Animal studies appear consistent
with the role of premotor and
intraparietal areas in the sense of body
ownership, insofar as they are clearly
critical for multisensory integration.
Both areas receive projections from
visual association and somatosensory
areas [11], and both contain neurons
that respond to visual and tactile
stimulation [12] and have visual
receptive fields that are anchored to the
limb. As such, these receptive fields
movewith the limb, ensuring consistent
visuotactile coupling [12]. That the
intraparietal activation associated with
ownership was lateralised to the left in
the Petkova et al. study [1] appears
consistent with the established role
of this brain area in motor and
body-related attention [13,14].
Other brain areas are important in
multisensory integration and have been
implicated in body ownership, most
notably the temporoparietal junction.
Temporoparietal junction activity
mirrored the out-of-body sensation
induced in healthy volunteers [15];
stimulation of the temporoparietal
junction in a patient undergoing brain
surgery evoked out-of-body sensation
[16], and, in a series of neurological
patients who reported out of body
experiences, lesion analysis revealed
damage at the temporoparietal
junction across the group [17]. In fact,
the temporoparietal junction is
implicated in other disorders of
embodiment and self-location, which
are attributed to different kinds of
disruption of multisensory integration
[18]. One might suggest then that the
temporoparietal junction is critical
for the feeling of disembodiment
rather than embodiment.
Petkova et al. [1] extend the vast
body ofwork on illusory limbownership
to illusory whole-body ownership, in
which the left ventral premotor cortex
seems to be particularly important.
They substantiate this claim in two
ways. First, they designed an
experiment to specifically interrogateneural activity associated full body
versus partial body ownership: the
mannequin’s hand was either attached
to, or detached from, the mannequin’s
body, and the mannequin’s hand and
the participant’s hand were stroked in
an asynchronous or synchronous
manner. Activation in the three
multisensory areas was greater during
the attached synchronous trials than it
was during the other trials. However,
this finding may simply reflect the
reduced vividness of the illusion in
these conditions — certainly such
factors as congruence of felt and seen
position and orientation are known to
affect the rubber hand illusion [19].
Second, and perhapsmore compelling,
multivoxel pattern analysis [20]
revealed, in all twenty participants, a
cluster of voxels, activity of which was
specific to the full-body illusion across
multiple studies. This is in contrast to
the majority of voxels, in which activity
varied according to the body part used
to induce the illusion.
We are still short of fully
understanding the unity we have with
our body, eloquently described by
Descartes centuries ago. In the first
instance, it would seem prudent to
clarify that the key role of the ventral
premotor cortex in full body ownership
is truly about ownership and not about
the induction of the illusion [9]. More
importantly, if we are to move forward
we need new paradigms and new
experimental approaches. We need a
method of experimentally modulating
ownership over our own body.
Although elegant, the illusory
ownership studies really only reveal the
neural substrate of owning another
body, not our own.References
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for Cellular InvadersCellular invasion through protein matrices is a critical process during
epithelial–mesenchymal transitions. A recent study of Caenorhabditis
elegans vulval development reports a novel invasive mechanism in which
cells coordinate spatially restricted degradation and sliding of a basement
membrane during cellular ingression and tissue formation.Mark Schramp and Jeff Hardin
The invasion of cells through the
basement membrane is a critical
process during animal development,
when mesenchymal cells detach from
their resident epithelia to migrate
within the embryo [1]. Additionally,
the re-acquisition of invasiveness is
one of the earliest steps in metastasis
[2]. The ‘standard’ model of cellular
invasion through an underlying
basement membrane involves two
premises: decreased or altered
expression of genes whose protein
products are essential to the
structural integrity of the extracellular
matrix (ECM), leading to a more
porous or labile matrix; and/or the
localized and regulated secretion of
proteases to degrade ECM
components to form a hole in the
matrix through which cells can move.
Examples of each of these processes
have been well documented,
and include the loss of certain
basement-membrane-associated
proteins and increased secretion of the
glycoprotein fibronectin during tumor
cell invasion [3] and the enhancedsecretion and activity of matrix
metalloproteases during neurulation
[4]. Studies of other invasive events,
however, such as leukocyte invasion
into endothelial-based tissues, suggest
that collaborative processes between
multiple cell types are critical to form
basement membrane gaps [5]. Recent
work by Ihara et al. [6] indicates that
another, novel mechanism exists to
promote cell invasion. In this case,
migrating cells expand a previously
formed gap in the basementmembrane
by sliding the perforated ECM apart,
allowing them to move through it.
During development of the
vulva in Caenorhabditis elegans
hermaphrodites, epithelial cells known
as vulval precursor cells (VPCs) are
born on the ventral surface of the
animal. The VPCs then invaginate,
giving rise to a stack of seven toroids
(vulA, ventral-most, through vulF,
dorsal-most; Figure 1) that form an
epithelial lumen through which mating
and the passage of fertilized eggs or
embryos occurs [7]. Vulval invagination
is preceded by the localized secretion
of proteases from the anchor cell (AC)
and its subsequentmovement adjacentto the 1-fated VPCs, which form direct
attachmentswith uterine epithelial cells
[8]. This invasive event creates a gap in
both the gonadal and ventral basement
membranes, through which the
invaginating cells will ultimately pass
(Figure 1). Thus, C. elegans vulval
development provides a unique in vivo
system to further define the molecular
mechanisms of cell invasion, and its
consequences for other concurrent
morphogenetic events.
Ihara et al. [6] began their analysis by
using a tried-and-true approach in
C. elegans — laser ablation — to
identify which cells are involved in
widening the perforation that normally
forms at the site of AC invasion and
found that both VPCs and ventral
uterine cells are required. Ihara et al. [6]
went on to use several important
technical approaches to identify how
regulated formation of basement
membrane perforations occurs
during AC invasion, and which cells
are involved. One is the use of
Dendra — a stable, photoconvertible,
fluorescent protein [9] — fused to
components of the basement
membrane (such as laminin) to track
ECMmovement. Using this technology,
Ihara et al. [6] showed that the
basement membrane adjacent to the
ECM gap induced by AC invasion
remains intact while the diameter
of the gap increases. Furthermore,
photobleached basement membranes
proximal and distal to the expanding
gap had similar rates of fluorescence
recovery, suggesting that decreased
membrane deposition does not
